Similarly, a business person who loves his or her family but still goes to work on Sunday because a contract needs to be closed, exercises self-discipline. If the business person is driven by self-interest e. Given the radical nature of the idea of purity, self-discipline can only count as moral self-discipline if the agent—mysteriously—goes against all of his or her natural desires.
So a second criterion is that there must be suffering tout court Kant , AA 5, pp. In terms of criteria relevant for the representation, this means that there must be signs that the agent is making a sacrifice. An agent makes a sacrifice when his or her acceptance of certain disadvantages cannot be easily explained in terms of his or her other interests.
There is suffering without explanation , at least in terms of how we know this agent normally thinks and acts. A classic case in which a moral account like that can be construed is the miser Scrooge. In doing so, he goes fully against his natural character i. Self-discipline can be represented as a struggle between the natural self and the transcendental moral self. Hence, the sacrifice is a process that we must conceptualize as internal to a person.
Externally visible sacrifices may be the effect of—and thus signify—this struggle between nature and freedom but they just as well may not. While it is true that a conscious self-disciplinary moral action comes with pain because of the sacrifice made , it must not be reduced to that.
These actions also and necessarily come with a sense of pride, as the agent realizes what he or she was able to do. This recognition unleashes a feeling of great pleasure. We can thus add as a third criterion: the agent demonstrates a sense of pride and joy on account of his or her accomplishment.
If our final i. We are merely saying that people should not reject their own sense of being a moral agent by rejecting the possibility that they are in fact, moral creatures who can be motivated by morality. It is important to make this qualification because a strange effect of having to live in a cynical world is that people internalize the cynicism and start interpreting their own life in terms of self-interest only, out of fear that moral purists will call them hypocrites.
To conclude, the three criteria of the representation that we have identified for an out of character morally worthy action are the presence of self-discipline, sacrifice, and moral pride for being a moral creature.
If clear signs are present that these criteria are met in practice, we have reason to build a moral account of a situation. This does not mean that all cases in which we can build such an account are cases in which there is morally worthy conduct. The moral account must be assessed alongside the account in terms of self-interest in an overall, third judgment. Please note that in this section, we are not trying to come up with a final judgement on a case.
The final judgement is a third judgement, based on weighing two initial judgements, one building the self-interested account; the other building a moral story. There are many Kantian based reasons why we are not prone in making a final judgement, including the requirement to have more information.
The limited goal of this section is merely to build the initial moral story, using the criteria we developed. It goes without saying that a self-interested account can also be constructed in both cases. In order to give a final judgement, it even must be constructed. It is a program in which welfare beneficiaries are retrained to become workers for the Marriott group.
The program received numerous awards and recognitions. It was also used by Norman Bowie as an excellent example of moral acting by a CEO of a large family owned company.
The Wall street Journal reported about the challenges posed by the program:. Marriott nurtures workers with all kinds of problems: A woman severely beaten by her boyfriend, a man who did time for manslaughter, a woman in an incestuous relationship with her brother, an addict who relapsed, people evicted from their homes or homeless shelters.
Its employees drive welfare trainees to work, arrange their day care, negotiate with their landlords, bicker with their caseworkers, buy them clothes, visit them at home, coach them in everything from banking skills to self-respect — and promise those who stick it out full-time jobs, at Marriott or elsewhere.
Even then, the trainees often show up late, work slowly, fight with co-workers and go AWOL, for reasons as simple as a torn stocking. Wall Street Journal, October 30 th , It is clear from this account that the company goes out of its way to reach a goal with considerable societal benefit. The CEO, J. Marriott Jr recognized the challenges put forward by the program and the fact that it pushed the company out of its comfort zone. Looking at this case from the perspective of building the moral story, there are clear indications that our first two criteria self-discipline and sacrifice are fulfilled.
We think the moral account of this case is weakened because of this circumstance. There are problems with the third criterion. Marriot Jr. According to the third criterion, moral agents should rejoice about morality. As said, this is not a final judgement on the case. It is just the initial moral account, but given our criteria, we think that the chances to build a strong moral account in this case are lower than Bowie thinks they are.
The reason is that Bowie does not take the third criterion into account. He would for instance insist that managers meet the people they wanted to hire in the family context before taking a final decision.
A meeting outside the professional sphere forced his managers to meet the person himself or herself, not just the employee. Importantly, he would demand the same if people had to be fired. It is uncomfortable to see the human being behind the employee in this case but Ouimet deemed it necessary to take the un easy road in order to remain a human company. Further, in one of his interviews, Ouimet admitted how he sometimes struggled to retain a respectful attitude towards his employees in other ways as well:.
So I step out, calm down, then go back in and apologize. Preville , p. These are clear examples of an attitude of self-constraint and sacrifice that demand moral praise.
When looking at the third criterion moral pride , we think this case is stronger than the previous one. He categorically refuses to see his attempts to create a moral firm as managerial tricks introduced only as tools in order to increase productivity Preville , p. The urge to testify about the need to bring a human face to capitalism has in fact characterized the life of this CEO until his death. Again, we are not making a final judgement.
We are just showing how the criteria work out if one aims at creating the moral account, necessary before making a final judgement. Again, before the final judgement is made, we can and must also look at the case from the perspective of self-interest. Naturally, a case can be built here as well. He points out that the company never had a strike in 75 years; that its profit index has risen from in to in and that profits after taxes were higher than for any of his competitors Ouimet , p.
Cynicism about morality in business ought to be a moral concern because it is detrimental to the advancement of morality in the market. Moral purism is an important source of moral cynicism. Its relentless discounting quest for purity leads people to conclude that there is no morally worthy conduct in business.
We developed a criticism of moral purism as a theory of how to judge moral worthiness in concrete cases. This criticism can be summarized in two propositions:. Moral purism is only fair to its own radical view of purity if it acknowledges that a case must always be judged in terms of two accounts before a third and final judgement can be made: the natural account which reduces conduct to nature and thus self-interest and the moral account that interprets conduct in the world of freedom.
The third judgement is a judgement on judgements. Moral purists stand in danger of ignoring the moral account. They take the possibility of a natural explanation as proof of its validity. As a result, morality is unduly reasoned away in the purist judgement. Kantian thinking helped us to build this criticism of the implicit theory of judgement that the purist uses.
It laid out the need for a procedure that must be followed in making judgements on cases. It also helped us to develop a set of criteria that a person can use to construe a representation alongside the mere idea. These criteria are self-discipline, sacrifice, and moral pride.
On the basis of these criteria a fair moral story can be built about moral worthiness in reality. We illustrated our criteria on the basis of two business ethics cases.
In many discussions on moral purism, Kant is presented as the paradigmatic moral purist. But Kant was particularly critical of moral purism. We think our quotes from Kant provide sufficient proof but we realize that we take a stance in the intra-Kantian discussion on overdetermination.
We side with the minority who rejects this possibility. We wrote a separate paper on this discussion, explaining our views. There cannot be overdetermination because the structure of an out of duty action is that morality freedom overcomes self-interest nature. Translations from the Critique of Practical Reason are taken from the translation by Pluhar If we play the discounting game and push it to its limits, we can insist that as a religious person Bonhoeffer was merely concerned about the after-life.
Some people are psychologically disposed either to live as a lion or to give up on life. They have no interest in living as a mouse.
If so, Mandela was just as self-interested as anybody else. Even supposedly holy creatures are not safe from the discounting game. In many religions, holy creatures are supposed to have a pure motivation. Yet, as a purist I may argue that Jesus could have known that his reward was reunion with his Father. Hence, he was just being selfish in doing what he did. Sometimes the ideal of a free market is described and legitimized as a domain of action in which people purely behave non-moral and self-interested all the time; due to the institutional design of the market, this behavior results in the highest possible economic output and both the domain and all behavior within it, is thereby morally legitimized, after all.
It is clear that Kant rejects this ideal of the market. It forces people to give up their own independent being as moral creatures.
This does not mean that Kant is against the idea of a market society: the idea of the market can also—and even a lot better—be justified without having to give up the idea that at agent level, people must always be moral creatures. This is done for example in the Austrian tradition see: Dubbink Is it science in the strict sense, thus in terms of its object restricted to things that have a sensory correlate stones etc. Compatibilism emphasizes that determinism and free will are compatible; Kant insist that the scientific interpretation of a human being is incompatible with the moral view which presupposes that human beings are free.
Speaking strictly Kantian, it is not a representation but a presentation as the noumenal has no presentation that can be represented. We leave aside this complication. Abraham, R. Organizational cynicism: Bases and consequences.
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Korsgaard, C. Self-constitution: Agency, identity, and integrity. Kothandaraman, P. Marketing Management Journal, 22 2 , 1— Kant: Eine Biographie. Leisinger, K. Corporate responsibilities for access to medicines. Journal of Business Ethics, 85 3 , 3— May Yee, N. Is CSR hypocritical? International Journal of Arts and Commerce, 3 7 , 72— McCarty, R. Mikhail, J. The poverty of the moral stimulus. Sinnot-Armstrong Ed. The evolution of morality: Innateness and adaption Vol. Mustain, M.
Overcoming cynicism. William James and the metaphysics of engagement. New York: Continuum. Odou, P. Consumer cynicism: From resistance to anti-consumption in a disenchanted world? Ouimet, R. The golden book , 4e edn. Piaget, J. The moral judgment of the child.
Preville, P. Canadian Business, 25, 58— Prinz, J. Is morality innate. Moral Psychology, 1, — Sterelny, K. Moral nativism: A skeptical response. Thiel, K. Luetge Ed. Trevino, L. Managing business ethics: Straight talk about how to do it right 4th ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Van Buren, H. Kolb Ed. Sage, CA: Thousand Oaks. Van de Ven, B. One strategy favored recently has been to turn back to the arguments of Groundwork II for help.
Kant himself repeatedly claimed that these arguments are merely analytic but that they do not establish that there is anything that answers to the concepts he analyzes.
Kant clearly takes himself to have established that rational agents such as ourselves must take the means to our ends, since this is analytic of rational agency. But there is a chasm between this analytic claim and the supposed synthetic conclusion that rational agency also requires conforming to a further, non-desire based, principle of practical reason such as the CI.
Nevertheless, some see arguments in Groundwork II that establish just this. If this assumption is true, then if one can on independent grounds prove that there is something which is an end in itself, one will have an argument for a categorical imperative. One such strategy, favored by Korsgaard and Wood relies on the apparent argument Kant gives that humanity is an end in itself.
Guyer, by contrast, sees an argument for freedom as an end in itself Guyer Both strategies have faced textual and philosophical hurdles. The core idea is that Kant believed that all moral theories prior to his own went astray because they portrayed fundamental moral principles as appealing to the existing interests of those bound by them. This in turn apparently implies that our wills are necessarily aimed at what is rational and reasonable.
To will something, on this picture, is to govern oneself in accordance with reason. Often, however, we fail to effectively so govern ourselves because we are imperfect rational beings who are caused to act by our non—rational desires and inclinations. The result, at least on one version of this interpretation Wolff , is that we either act rationally and reasonably and so autonomously or we are merely caused to behave in certain ways by non—rational forces acting on us and so heteronomously.
This is, however, an implausible view. It implies that all irrational acts, and hence all immoral acts, are not willed and therefore not free. However, several prominent commentators nonetheless think that there is some truth in it Engstrom ; Reath ; Korsgaard , , In particular, when we act immorally, we are either weak—willed or we are misusing our practical reason by willing badly.
We do not have the capacity to aim to act on an immoral maxim because the will is identified with practical reason, so when we will to perform an immoral act, we implicitly but mistakenly take our underlying policy to be required by reason.
Our choice is nonetheless free and attributable to us because our will was involved in leading us to take the act to be rational and reasonable. It remains to be seen whether, on this complicated interpretation of Kant, it sufficiently allows for the possibility that one can knowingly and willingly do wrong if the will is practical reason and practical reason is, in part, the moral law.
Thus, rather than treating admirable character traits as more basic than the notions of right and wrong conduct, Kant takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on that basis defines virtue as a kind of strength and resolve to act on those principles despite temptations to the contrary.
Moreover, the disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz. Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean between two vices.
The Aristotelian view, he claimed, assumes that virtue typically differs from vice only in terms of degree rather than in terms of the different principles each involves MM , They differ in that the prodigal person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of possessing them. Fourth, in classical views the distinction between moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly significant.
A virtue is some sort of excellence of the soul, but one finds classical theorists treating wit and friendliness alongside courage and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary between non-moral and moral virtues could not be more sharp.
Even so, Kant shows a remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed, much of Anthropology is given over to discussing the nature and sources of a variety of character traits, both moral and non-moral. Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses or temptations.
Should all of our desires and interests be trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not change the fact that each and every desire and interest could have run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they can conflict with moral law, not the fact that they actually do conflict with it, that makes duty a constraint, and hence is virtue essentially a trait concerned with constraint.
For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing a good will G 6: That one acts from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary interests and desires. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the lack of strength to follow through with that commitment.
Among the virtues Kant discusses are those of self-respect, honesty, thrift, self-improvement, beneficence, gratitude, sociability, and forgiveness. Kant also distinguishes vice, which is a steadfast commitment to immorality, from particular vices, which involve refusing to adopt specific moral ends or committing to act against those ends.
Although Kant gives several examples in the Groundwork that illustrate this principle, he goes on to describe in later writings, especially in The Metaphysics of Morals , a complicated normative ethical theory for interpreting and applying the CI to human persons in the natural world.
His framework includes various levels, distinctions and application procedures. Kant, in particular, describes two subsidiary principles that are supposed to capture different aspects of the CI.
These principles, in turn, justify more specific duties of right and of ethics and virtue. For example, Kant claims that the duty not to steal the property of another person is narrow and perfect because it precisely defines a kind of act that is forbidden.
The duty of beneficence, on the other hand, is characterized as wide and imperfect because it does not specify exactly how much assistance we must provide to others.
Even with a system of moral duties in place, Kant admits that judgment is often required to determine how these duties apply to particular circumstances. It denies, in other words, the central claim of teleological moral views.
For instance, act consequentialism is one sort of teleological theory. It asserts that the right action is that action of all the alternatives available to the agent that has the best overall outcome. Here, the goodness of the outcome determines the rightness of an action. Another sort of teleological theory might focus instead on character traits. In this case, it is the goodness of the character of the person who does or would perform it that determines the rightness of an action.
In both cases, as it were, the source or ground of rightness is goodness. Rightness, on the standard reading of Kant, is not grounded in the value of outcomes or character. There are several reasons why readers have thought that Kant denies the teleological thesis. First, he makes a plethora of statements about outcomes and character traits that appear to imply an outright rejection of both forms of teleology.
This appears to say that moral rightness is not a function of the value of intended or actual outcomes. These certainly appear to be the words of someone who rejects the idea that what makes actions right is primarily their relationship to what good may come of those actions, someone who rejects outright the act consequentialist form of teleology.
Moreover, Kant begins the Groundwork by noting that character traits such as the traditional virtues of courage, resolution, moderation, self-control, or a sympathetic cast of mind possess no unconditional moral worth, G —94, — If the moral rightness of an action is grounded in the value of the character traits of the person who performs or would perform it then it seems Kant thinks that it would be grounded in something of only conditional value.
This certainly would not comport well with the virtue ethics form of teleology. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his Utilitarianism , Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim.
And because they are universal, Hare argued, they forbid making exceptions. Indeed, Cummiskey argues that they must be: Respect for the value of humanity entails treating the interests of each as counting for one and one only, and hence for always acting to produce the best overall outcome. That, she argues, would imply that there would be no reason to conform to them.
Instead, Kant thought the principles of rationality taken together constitute rational agency, and rational agency so constituted itself functions as a value that justifies moral action , Guyer argues that autonomy itself is the value grounding moral requirements. And Wood argues that humanity itself is the grounding value for Kant.
While the second Critique claims that good things owe their value to being the objects of the choices of rational agents, they could not, in his view, acquire any value at all if the source of that value, rational agency, itself had no value , ; see also —8. If their value thereby becomes the source of the rightness of our actions — say, our actions are right if and because they treat that self-standing value in various ways — then her reading too is teleological. On the latter view, moral demands gain their authority simply because a rational will, insofar as you are rational, must will them.
On the former view, by contrast, a rationale is at hand: because your will is, insofar as it is rational, good. Proponents of this former reading are, however, then left with the burden of explaining how it could be the autonomy of the will alone that explains the authority of morality.
One might have thought that this question is quite easy to settle. At the basis of morality, Kant argued, is the Categorical Imperative, and imperatives are not truth apt. But, in fact, the question is not at all easy.
Thus while at the foundation of morality there would be an imperative which is not truth apt, particular moral judgments themselves would describe what that imperative rules out and so would themselves be truth apt. Philosophers such as R. Objectivity, according to Hare, is to be understood as universality, and the Categorical Imperative prescribes universally. A second issue that has received considerable attention is whether Kant is a metaethical constructivist or realist.
Constructivism in metaethics is the view that moral truths are, or are determined by, the outcomes of actual or hypothetical procedures of deliberation or choice. Autonomy, in this sense, means that such agents are both authors and subjects of the moral law and, as such, are not bound by any external requirements that may exist outside of our wills. Instead, we are only subject to moral requirements that we impose on ourselves through the operation of our own reason independently of our natural desires and inclinations.
The common error of previous ethical theories, including sentimentalism, egoism and rationalism, is that they failed to recognize that morality presupposes that we have autonomy of the will.
On these interpretations, Kant is a skeptic about arbitrary authorities, such as God, natural feelings, intrinsic values or primitive reasons that exist independently of us. Only reason itself has genuine authority over us, so we must exercise our shared powers of reasoned deliberation, thought and judgment, guided by the Categorical Imperative as the most basic internal norm of reason, to construct more specific moral requirements.
Kantians in this camp, however, disagree about how this rational procedure should be characterized. Other commentators interpret Kant as a robust moral realist Ameriks ; Wood ; Langton ; Kain The moral law then specifies how we should regard and treat agents who have this special status.
Autonomy of the will, on this view, is a way of considering moral principles that are grounded in the objective value of rational nature and whose authority is thus independent of the exercise of our wills or rational capacities. Some interpreters of Kant, most notably Korsgaard , seem to affirm a kind of quietism about metaethics by rejecting many of the assumptions that contemporary metaethical debates rest on.
For example, some of these philosophers seem not to want to assert that moral facts and properties just are the outcomes of deliberative procedures. Rather, they seem more eager to reject talk of facts and properties as unnecessary, once a wholly acceptable and defensible procedure is in place for deliberation. Once we are more sensitive to the ethical concerns that really matter to us as rational agents, we will find that many of the questions that animate metaethicists turn out to be non-questions or of only minor importance.
Most translations include volume and page numbers to this standard Academy edition. Citations in this article do so as well. The following volumes of that series are especially relevant to his moral theory:. There have been several comprehensive commentaries on the Groundwork that have been published recently, some of which also include new English translations. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy 2. Good Will, Moral Worth and Duty 3. Duty and Respect for Moral Law 4.
Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives 5. The Formula of the Universal Law of Nature 6. The Humanity Formula 7. The Autonomy Formula 8. The Kingdom of Ends Formula 9. The Unity of the Formulas Autonomy Virtue and Vice Normative Ethical Theory Teleology or Deontology? Duty and Respect for Moral Law According to Kant, what is singular about motivation by duty is that it consists of bare respect for the moral law. Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categorical imperative.
The following volumes of that series are especially relevant to his moral theory: Practical Philosophy , translated by Mary Gregor, Schneewind, Booth tr. Engstrom and J. Whiting eds. Hill, Thomas E. Bagnoli ed. Johnson, Robert N. Shafer-Landau ed. Betzler ed. Paton, H. Ross, W. Schneewind, J. Timmermann ed. Sullivan, Roger J. Timmons, Mark ed. Wolff, Robert Paul ed. Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.
Kant Papers , articles, links, news and reviews about Kantian philosophy. Related Entries autonomy: personal character, moral consequentialism consequentialism: rule constructivism: in metaethics ethics: deontological ethics: virtue Kant, Immanuel Kant, Immanuel: account of reason Kant, Immanuel: aesthetics and teleology Kant, Immanuel: and Hume on morality Kant, Immanuel: philosophical development Kant, Immanuel: philosophy of religion Kant, Immanuel: social and political philosophy Kant: transcendental idealism morality, definition of practical reason respect rights.
Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. A common question, which is perhaps considered to be one of the most important questions within ethical discussion, centres around what morality can and does require from us.
Therefore when trying to decide how to conduct ourselves morally, we should aim to ignore feeling such as sympathy, which we in practise place high moral value on, and just focus on the restricting quality of duty. Get Access.
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